



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

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What Soviet Amnesty Means

by John N. Hazard

1953
By a decree of March 28 the Malenkov government ordered a revision of the criminal code and an amnesty for several classes of criminals. The Ministry of Justice is directed to redraft the present code with a view to replacing prison terms by administrative penalties—warnings, reprimands, censures, fines and possibly job dismissals—for the less dangerous categories of crime. It must also release immediately from prison persons now serving terms running up to five years, inclusive, regardless of their offenses.

Persons serving longer terms must be released if they are women with children up to 10 years of age, pregnant women, women over the age of 50 and men over the age of 55. Also to be released regardless of the length of their sentences are persons serving terms for offenses falling under the chapters of the code entitled "official" and "economic" crimes.

Persons serving terms longer than five years who are not in the categories to be released are to have their sentences reduced by half. Trials currently in process are to be terminated immediately if the maximum penalty for the offense could be only five years or less. Trials for more serious offenses shall proceed,

but the penalty in the event of conviction shall not exceed one-half that currently permitted by the code.

Those expected to benefit most under the decree are junior officials serving terms for exceeding their authority or failing to use their authority, clerks in state stores who have cheated customers by giving short weight or measure, directors of state factories which have produced goods below official standards, workers who had been absent without leave, thieves of privately owned property and those who have been guilty of disorderly conduct. Persons imprisoned for political offenses and for such serious crimes as embezzlement or larceny of state property are specifically excluded from the application of the decree, as are murderers and those who are professionally lawless in organized bands.

The decree is silent on the fate of those serving terms in forced labor camps under sentence of the Special Boards of the Ministry of the Interior. Presumably this group of people, of whom so much has already been said in the United Nations, will not benefit from the amnesty, for Soviet practice has always distinguished this group from persons

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tried by the ordinary criminal courts. They are interned not because they have violated a provision of the criminal code but as part of the pacification process undertaken by the government in restless areas where the slower and personalized procedure of the criminal courts has been regarded unsuitable for the task at hand.

Why have the amnesty and code revision been decreed? The law gives an official explanation in its preamble, saying that the achievement of a high standard of living and of a sense of public duty among the population makes criminal penalties unnecessary to preserve public order. In this explanation the new Soviet government seems to be courting a doctrine discarded by Stalin in 1930, namely the doctrine of the *gradual* withering away of the state. All Soviet Marxists have agreed that force would not be required to control society in the final stage of social development because (1) economic motivation to crime would be eliminated by production sufficient to distribute goods in accordance with need and (2) the development of a sense of social duty in the population would make control through police and court unnecessary.

Will State Wither Away?

The difference among Soviet Marxists has been over the manner of withering. Stalin said in 1930 that the force of law could not be eliminated until the economic and social goals had been achieved completely. Others contended that the withering

could occur gradually. For this they were denounced and their ringleaders were purged. Yet many intellectuals both within the U.S.S.R. and abroad felt that Stalin's approach was utopian, and lost faith in the future of the Soviet way of life. The position taken by the new government may regain the active support of these intellectuals and also make some new friends for the U.S.S.R.

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and its government, particularly in Western Europe and India.

The decree may also have been designed to win friends among the junior officials as well as among the clerks and workers against whom criminal sanctions had been increased during World War II. Steps had already been taken in this direction through milder application of wartime laws after the war and the apparent repeal of the 1940 law penalizing absent workers.

Further steps toward relaxation of legal procedures seem indicated by the announcement on April 4 of the release of the 15 doctors accused of killing Andrei A. Zhdanov, secretary of the Central Committee of the

Communist party. The emphasis of the announcement on false evidence suggests that Soviet policy-makers are seeking to regain the confidence of the people. The fact that the public might conclude from the doctors' release that all past purge trials had been frauds seems not to have been anticipated by the government. While confident American commentators have related the release to the desire of Lavrenti P. Beria, deputy prime minister and minister of interior and security, to clear his name, it seems unlikely that Beria is sufficiently in control of the government or so stubborn as not to have considered the impact of this measure on public opinion.

Amnesty and World Affairs

Finally, this change in policy may reflect genuine Soviet intentions to adopt a more temperate foreign policy in the months to come. Severe domestic measures have often accompanied periods of international tension, as with the law on labor absentees in 1940, while relaxation has been permitted when relative calm has prevailed on the world scene, as with the abolition after the war of the death penalty, which was restored in part when tensions re-emerged. The new attitude toward punishment for crime suggests that the U.S.S.R. may anticipate an abatement of international friction in the near future.

(Dr. Hazard is professor of public law at Columbia University and author of a book entitled *Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R.*, which will be published in the autumn.)

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Will Protectionism Succeed?

Contrary to expectations raised before and during the Presidential election campaign last summer and autumn, the advocates of a liberalized policy of international trade found themselves on the defensive when the House Ways and Means Committee on April 22 opened hearings on the bill to continue the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

The chief reason is that the bill itself is an expression of protectionist sentiment. Congressional adoption of the bill in its present form would in effect mark, not the extension of legislation which now in essence is 19 years old, but rather the end of that 19-year era of reciprocity in American trade relationships, which opened with the enactment of the first trade agreement bill in 1934, and reached its climax in tariff reductions the United States agreed upon at the international conferences of Geneva in 1947, Annecy in 1949 and Torquay in 1951. The successive trade agreements acts have resulted in a gradual reduction of several of the highly protectionist schedules in the last major protectionist tariff bill, the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. The new bill makes further reductions difficult and explicitly provides for some tariff increases.

Elimination of President

The most noteworthy feature of the bill is its withdrawal from the President of his privilege of overruling Tariff Commission recommendations that the rate on any specific product be raised (if it had previously been lowered by a trade agreement) when the American makers of that product satisfy the Commission that they are being damaged

economically by competition from abroad. President Eisenhower has used his privilege to prevent a rise in the tariff on briar for making briar pipes, and President Truman used it with respect to watches, garlic and other products.

Perils of 'Peril Point'

The elimination of the President from the scene is a logical development in the effort to temper the liberalizing character of the trade agreements program with protectionism by enactment in 1948 and 1951 of the "peril point" provision. This provision offers American manufacturers the opportunity to ask the Tariff Commission for the kind of relief the Commission was willing to grant for watches and briar. The Presidential rebuffs to the Commission provoked the authors of the new bill to endow the Commission with plenary powers. Moreover, the bill would raise the membership of the Commission from six to seven, with the proviso that four of the seven represent one political party. Insofar as congressional protectionists can influence the appointment of members of the Commission, this clause improves the chances that the Commission will grant relief to most of the peril-point petitioners. By this procedure most tariff schedules can ultimately be returned to the Smoot-Hawley levels.

The bill being considered by the House Ways and Means Committee explicitly creates new trade barriers by imposing additional duties on lead and zinc and by forbidding the importation of foreign petroleum after fixed quotas have been filled. Neither the oil quota nor the lead and zinc tariffs are subject to "modi-

fication or suspension by any foreign trade agreement or otherwise," according to the bill. The lead and zinc duties are subject to change in one respect, however; they would shift according to a sliding scale of imports and prices, with relief automatically prescribed for zinc and lead producers just as the parity price system gives farmers automatic relief from changes in the general price index.

Clash Over Tariff

These protectionist tendencies are out of harmony with hopes aroused by President Eisenhower's statement during the election campaign that "foreign trade is not just the frosting on our economic cake but one of its essential ingredients"; by support given by the Committee of Economic Development to freer trade and the subsequent appointment of the chief CED spokesman, Marion Folsom, to the post of Under Secretary of the Treasury in the Eisenhower Administration; and by free trade recommendations made by the Detroit Chamber of Commerce, Henry Ford 2nd and other groups and individuals previously considered as conservative about economic matters.

Yet many scarcely noted facts have been strengthening the protectionist cause. President Eisenhower, for example, has not pressed on Congress his own views with respect to trade policy, whatever they may be. The bill depriving the President of authority over the Tariff Commission is sponsored by Representative Richard M. Simpson, Republican of Pennsylvania, a member of the Ways and Means Committee, and the Adminis-

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Peace With a Grain of Salt

The mere hint that the Kremlin might be serious this time in proposing peace has brought into the open sharply contradictory trends of opinion in this country.

Some Americans have reacted by voicing the fear that peace would precipitate an economic recession, if not worse; by demanding slashes in defense expenditures and accompanying cuts in taxes; and by expressing the hope that the United States would be able to curtail drastically its military commitments abroad. Others have pointed out that return to an at least relatively peacetime economy could mean improvement in domestic living standards, recently neglected because of the emphasis on armaments; have urged that Washington, in contrast to the hasty demobilization of 1945, should remain sufficiently armed to meet a change in Soviet policy; and have taken the view that an unduly rapid dismantling of defense appropriations and taxes might leave the country defenseless in case of emergency.

Toward a Middle Course

Out of this welter of conflicting advice...three main trends emerge which may offer a middle course between hope and illusion.

(1) *A Flexible Foreign Policy.* President Eisenhower's press conference statements, as well as reports from Washington on April 9 about possible lines of action, indicate that the Administration intends to follow a flexible foreign policy, avoiding the sometimes rigid positions adopted by the Truman Administration, which had long been under fire for its "softness" toward Russia and communism. This flexibility has been hint-

ed, particularly with respect to the most controversial issues in the Far East—the armistice line in Korea and the future disposition of Formosa, which, it has been suggested, might be placed under a United Nations trusteeship. Although these reports were promptly denied, the Republican Administration apparently recognizes that the question of Korea can be settled only within the framework of an over-all Asian settlement that would include the war in Indochina, the problem of Japanese trade, and the possible admission of the Chinese Communist régime to the United Nations.

(2) *Continued Preparedness.* Remembering the sad experience of 1945, when the movement to "bring the boys back home" proved too strong for political and military leaders alike and left the United States in a position of dangerous world unbalance, as contrasted with the heavily armed U.S.S.R., the President, the Democrats in Congress and some Republican Congressmen have made it clear that they oppose heavily reduced military spending and expect American forces to remain for an indefinite period in Europe and Asia. On this issue, Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, broke with some of the G.O.P. chiefs on April 8, declaring that nothing on the horizon could "justify any mass reduction in the power of the United States and the free world in general" and that "the leopard has not really changed his spots."

(3) *Economy Can Survive Peace.* Administration spokesmen, as well as leading business men, alarmed by

the initial pessimistic reaction of the stock market to rumors of peace, have pointed out that if panic is avoided, the curtailment of defense expenditures would divert spending to consumer products, the building of schools and roads, and other items which had had to be postponed at the peak of the cold war. Meanwhile, labor leaders, notably Walter Reuther, have stressed the need for immediate planning to avert the possibility of a recession in case of drastic cuts in armament production.

The middle course between exaggerated optimism and exaggerated pessimism could give the country a realistic foreign policy free from the unreasoning fear which has produced here growing internal tensions reflected in violent accusations and suspicions. Such a course would reassure the non-Communist world, particularly if the United States, by adopting a liberal foreign trade policy, challenges Stalin's prediction that in the absence of war the "capitalist" nations will either clash with each other or suffer an economic collapse.

Many Americans have rightly criticized the historical determinism of Marxist theoreticians. Yet sometimes we seem to fall prey to a historical determinism of our own, as if hypnotized by the predictions of Soviet leaders. To settle such problems as Germany and Japan, Austria and Korea we must find a basis of agreement with the U.S.S.R. and other interested nations. But in at least three important sectors of foreign policy—the tariff, support of the United Nations, and practical demonstration of what democracy means in a highly industrialized great power—

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Britain's Economic Problem: Its Meaning for the U.S.



by Gardner Cowles

This *Foreign Policy Report* presents the main points of a statement on national policy by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development. Mr. Cowles is president of the Des Moines *Register and Tribune* and Cowles Magazines, Inc. and has served the Committee for Economic Development in many capacities. He is a member of CED's Research and Policy Committee and for several years has been chairman of its Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, which conducted the preliminary research on Britain's economic problems.

Informed persons in Britain and the United States agree that a new approach to Britain's economic problems must be found if the free world is to achieve the unity necessary for its security. The policy statement which is summarized here was prepared by the CED Research and Policy Committee in the hope that it would contribute to an understanding of Britain's economic problem, its meaning to the United States, and the measures for dealing with it, as seen through American eyes.

Since the war Britain has had two main economic problems. First, the output of the British economy has not been growing fast enough nor in the right directions. Second, Britain has been plagued with continuing internal inflation. For these reasons it has not been able simultaneously to bear the cost of a major military role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to maintain its position in the British Commonwealth, to satisfy the rising economic expectations of its people, and to balance its international payments.

The problem is not a temporary one of recovery from the war. It is now clear that an American policy of merely propping up the British economy by continuing aid on the present basis would be self-defeating. Many of the measures needed are combined United States-Britain-Commonwealth measures.

Because the security of the United States is so much affected by Britain's strength and friendship, the British economic problem is in part an American problem.

Britain's economic difficulties are far more acute today than during the interwar years, despite the recovery of British production to well above prewar levels. This is in part a direct effect of the war itself. The British problem has also been worsened by deep-seated changes in the political and economic structure of the world, which were aggravated by the war. And in part, Britain's economic troubles today are the result of a new development: a tendency for domestic and foreign demands on the British economy to grow more rapidly than output.

Balance of Payments Troubles

The strain on Britain's balance of payments, which was already developing in the 1930's, has been intensified. In the face of a rising world demand for agricultural commodities since the war, the rate of growth of agricultural exports from nondollar countries has declined. This has aggravated Britain's balance-of-payments problem, for it has raised the prices of British imports relative to British export prices. And Britain has been forced to buy from the United States and Canada agricultural staples formerly imported from nondollar areas. This is a central reason for Britain's "dollar shortage."

Britain's dollar earnings from services, such as shipping, and from its dollar investments have declined. And except in the remaining British colonies, Britain is no longer able to earn dollars net in "third areas"—areas other than Europe and North America. The result has been the

United Kingdom's continuing dollar deficit, which has been financed by American aid and by drawing on gold and dollar reserves.

Britain's inability to earn sufficient dollars by building up a surplus of exports over imports from independent third countries, a surplus which could be paid for in dollars as before the war, is the result of several important developments. Apart from the adverse movement in Britain's terms of trade, it is the result mainly of the greater competitive ability of American industry in third areas. Not only are many of Britain's former third-area sources of dollar earnings turning to the United States for imports; Britain has also had to finance the dollar deficits of the sterling area members among the Commonwealth countries.

Britain has been unable to solve its dollar problem by increasing its direct exports to the United States. The novelty to British industry of making the necessary sales promotion effort, the shortage of funds for investment, and the insufficient initiative of much British management are not the only reasons for this failure. The American tariff prevents many British manufactures from being competitive in the American market from the point of view of price. Moreover, the British manufacturer fears that if he is successful in breaking into the American market, his American competitors will obtain an increased tariff against his product. Meanwhile, the gold and dollar reserve of the sterling area remains inadequate.

The British economy has failed to achieve a proper balance between money demand and the physical resources available to satisfy it. The result has been continuing inflationary pressure since the war. And because the pattern of demand has given such a high priority to consumption and social services, demand has been not only excessive but also badly distributed in terms of increasing productivity and exports. In addition, capital has been exported to the sterling area, primarily in the form of releases from the wartime sterling balances—the debt Britain owed to the rest of the sterling area. Since the Korean war began, rearmament has added to inflationary pressure. And finally, the sharply reduced rate of growth of productivity since 1950 has contributed to British inflation. While it has helped British industry to recover rapidly from its postwar low point, continuing inflationary pressure, plus the apparatus of direct controls and the heavy business taxation that have accompanied it, has proved damaging to Britain's international economic position. Inflation in Britain and in the sterling area inhibits current exports to non-sterling markets, retards necessary changes in the structure of British industry and cuts back the investment on which future growth of output and exports depends.

Three Main Issues

Looking ahead, the British government and people face three main issues:

First, how can industrial investment, especially in export industries, be expanded without further risk to monetary stability and further strain on Britain's balance of payments? This will require changes in the present composition of domestic investment, public and private. The CED believes that the British should

consider whether the present rate of public investment in less productive sectors could not be reduced and policies reoriented to promote investment in the industries where the best export opportunities exist.

Second, what policy should be followed concerning the level of wages and other money incomes? The now slower growth of British production and the need for increased exports and industrial investment suggest that increases in wages and in government social welfare payments will have to be kept within conservative limits.

Changes in U. S. Policies

Third, what level of military production should the British economy maintain over the next two or three years? A way must be found to increase the supply of capital goods needed to expand the capacity of British industry. If, for military reasons, the over-all NATO military program cannot be slowed down, an alternative is for the United States to assume a larger share of the NATO production program. But this complex issue involves a careful weighing of military against economic considerations, and the CED offers no judgment on its military aspect.

Decision on these difficult questions of policy is governed by an inescapable fact: the issue is not *whether* demands on British resources will be trimmed to the size of those resources, but *how* this will be brought about. This adjustment can be accomplished in an orderly and rational way only if the British people will accept a rate of growth of consumption consistent with Britain's present means and future solvency, and with its responsibilities in the Commonwealth, the Anglo-American partnership and NATO. If the British will adhere to a program of this kind, the United States should be prepared, if

necessary, to assume for a period an increased share of the burden of defending the free world.

Other measures are also needed to ease the strain on the balance of payments of the United Kingdom and sterling area. Measures are needed (1) to increase Britain's current dollar earnings, (2) to prevent excessive fluctuation in the sterling area's dollar earnings, (3) to increase confidence in sterling, and (4) to strengthen the economic organization of the Commonwealth.

American commercial policies reduce the ability of other countries to earn the dollars they need to pay for American exports. These policies, no longer justified on grounds of national interest, keep other countries dependent on American aid, adding substantially to the United States' tax burden and leading to a less efficient use of American resources.

CED therefore recommends (1) that the United States continue to negotiate selective reductions in our tariffs through an extended Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, free of weakening legislative amendments such as the "peril point" provisions; (2) that Congress grant to the President authority to reduce tariff duties unilaterally, under principles and limitations laid down by Congress; (3) simplification of United States customs procedures; (4) progressive removal of import quotas on United States agricultural imports; and (5) great liberalization, if not outright repeal, of the "Buy American Act."

British dollar earnings from services, particularly shipping, can be increased if present laws requiring preference to American ships are relaxed. And if measures can be taken to reduce fluctuations in United States imports of raw materials, sterling-area dollar earnings may be increased and made more stable.

At present, the holder of sterling

in Britain and the rest of the sterling area enjoys very limited rights to convert his pounds into dollars, even for current noncapital transactions. These restrictions reflect the sterling area's shortage of dollars relative to the demand of sterling-area residents for dollar imports and dollar services. Restrictions on the convertibility of sterling can be relaxed only as the sterling area's shortage of dollars is reduced, but the CED believes that it should be an objective of British and American policy to increase current account convertibility as rapidly as circumstances permit.

The sterling balances continue to represent a potential threat of more inflation in Britain. If means could be found to fund or to earmark for development-use a larger part of the balances, the financial position of Britain and the sterling area would be materially strengthened.

Sterling Area Problems

There is still another course that may be helpful in correcting the unbalance of the sterling area's international payments: adjustment of the exchange rate of the pound. Whether this course may be desirable in the future should be determined in the light of the success of the measures we have discussed above.

It has become increasingly clear over the last two or three years that the sterling area financial arrangements in their present form contribute to inflation and to the sterling area's balance-of-payments troubles. The CED believes, therefore, that present arrangements for consultation about, and coordination of, economic policies among Commonwealth members need strengthening.

The measures discussed here or others of similar purpose can improve the pattern of use of British resources and ease the strain on the sterling area's balance of payments.

But they will not be sufficient to overcome the more deep-seated and structural causes of the weakness of Britain's international economic position. To accomplish this requires the removal of fundamental obstacles to a more rapid long-run increase in the output of the British economy.

Structural Weaknesses

How can market opportunities for British exports be improved? The expansion of sales in the United States depends to a great extent on finding ways to give British manufacturers the feeling that they will have continuing access to the American market, without the danger of an increase in their tariff handicap. The prospective growth of demand of less-developed countries for British exports could be somewhat improved by an increased flow of American development capital to these countries, particularly those which are Commonwealth members.

Through its effects on Commonwealth demand for British exports, greater American private investment in Britain and the Commonwealth could make an important contribution to the basic problem of British industry. It would improve the dollar position of the sterling area. The main obstacle is lack of confidence on the part of American investors that their investments will not be subject to economic or political hazards essentially different from those at home. Measures are needed to increase the confidence of American investors.

How can the vigor and technical progressiveness of British industry be increased? The budget announced on April 14 by British Chancellor of the Exchequer R. A. Butler and its tax policy revisions appear to be a step in the direction of removing obstacles to progressive and adaptive business policies. CED believes that

the British government's support or tolerance of restrictive industrial and labor practices should be reconsidered, with a view to creating incentives and competitive pressures favorable to technological advance. And, finally, contact between British and American management and labor should be increased.

READING SUGGESTIONS

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- James R. Nelson and Donald K. Palmer, *The United States Foreign Economic Policy and the Sterling Area*. Memorandum No. 4 of The Center of International Studies (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University, March 1953).
- Lionel Robins, "The International Economic Problem," *Lloyds Bank Review* (London), January 1953.
- "What Price Convertibility," *The Economist* (London, February 28, 1953).
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Spotlight

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the decisions are up to us. This means that the public must be better informed, more responsible and more active in supporting the policies in which it believes than ever before. A cold peace may prove a greater test of our nerves than a cold war.

Unlike some of our more pessimistic observers, President Eisenhower, in his address of April 16 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, struck a hopeful note about the Soviet peace overtures and proposed that all nations devote "a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

tration has not prepared or proposed a substitute of its own. Moreover, the President has nominated for membership on the Tariff Commission a former member of the House of Representatives who in 1945 voted to end the trade agreements program (specifically, he voted to send back to the committee the bill to continue the trade agreements). The appointee is Joseph M. Talbot, Republican of Connecticut. The President also has named as Assistant Secretary of the Interior in charge of mineral re-

sources Felix E. Wormser, vice-president of the St. Joseph Lead Company, whose president has recommended the sliding-scale tariff for lead and zinc for which the Simpson Trade Agreements Bill provides. The presence of protectionists in the Eisenhower Administration encourages protectionists in Congress.

In March and April President Eisenhower received visits from British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, French Premier René Mayer and West German Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer. Each of them stressed the desirability of easing the flow of world trade as a paramount factor in

the strengthening of the Western world's economy. Thus they lifted the question of trade policy to the highest foreign policy level. Consequently, the prospect of a change of trade policy on the part of the United States could portend some revision in foreign policy. In the past, protectionism and isolationism have gone hand in hand in the United States. The fact that the new protectionist drive comes at a time when our allies seek "trade, not aid," and when Moscow hints at trade in the East, creates a grave problem for the Administration.

BLAIR BOLLES



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON THE U.S.S.R.

The "peace offensive" launched by the Kremlin following Stalin's death has turned public attention again to books about the U.S.S.R. *The Russians in Focus*, by Harold J. Berman (Boston, Little Brown, 1953, \$3), sums up political, economic and social developments in brief form and simple language. The author, research associate at the Harvard Russian Research Center, who teaches a course in Soviet and American law at the Harvard Law School, has some good things to say about Russia, particularly with respect to education and medical care, but comes to the conclusion that "the terror is explained by the system; the system is not explained by the terror."

A picture of Russia as seen by a European observer is given by Michel Gordey, foreign correspondent of *France-Soir*, a large-circulation Paris newspaper, in *Visa to Moscow* (New York, Knopf, 1952, \$4.50).

M. Gordey spent two months in Russia in 1950. His conclusion is that "fear is a bad counselor. . . . We must, before all else, avoid fostering or supporting the psychoses of fear that exist in the Soviet world." An interesting eyewitness account by an American is offered by Frank Rounds, Jr., who spent 18 months in the U.S.S.R. as an attaché of the United States Embassy, in *A Window on Red Square* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1953, \$3). Mr. Rounds was indefatigable in exploring all opportunities for information available to an American.

In *Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, \$4), George Fischer studies the Vlasov movement as an example of the sources, extent and nature of opposition to the Soviet government. Mr. Fischer, who lived 11 years in Russia before World War II and served as a captain

in our armed forces in the U.S.S.R. during the war, says that in the foreseeable future organized anti-Kremlin movements will not displace "the present [Stalin] regime in time of peace. For its success, the opposition requires major Soviet reverses (on Soviet soil), in a general war, together with large-scale and politically skillful support from the military opponent."

A survey of *American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947* (New York, Rinehart, 1952, \$5), based on a study of official documents, is presented by William A. Williams, assistant professor in American foreign relations at the University of Oregon. Mr. Williams is critical of Cordell Hull, who in his opinion took a narrow view of the issues involved in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, and challenges the "containment" policy formulated by George F. Kennan, former American Ambassador to Moscow.

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